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PUBLICITY IN HIGH PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
H. PATRICK FURMAN*
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.'
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury.2
No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Many may wonder about the wisdom of having a criminal lawyer
discuss the ethical problems associated with high profile cases. Over the
past few years, the performances of criminal lawyers on the public stage
have been decidedly uneven with respect to professionalism and ethical
behavior. We witnessed the spectacle of People v. Simpson.4 There, it
seemed that the lawyers spent more time in front of the camera than in
front of the bench. Ironically, after the trial, half of the lawyers got their
own television shows.5
The Simpson trial was an event which deserved to be labeled a trial
only because it occurred in a courtroom. It is more accurately described as
a long-running, made-for-television mini-series. On the other hand, since
cameras were not allowed in the courtroom, we witnessed, or at least we
heard and read about, the People v. McVeigh6 and People v. Nichols7 trials.
In these trials, a smart and tough judge kept a reign on both the lawyers
and the trial process.8 The net result of these efforts were trials that most
Americans viewed as substantively and procedurally fair.9
* Clinical Professor of Law, Director of Clinical Programs University of Colorado School
of Law, currently one of the attorneys for Patsy Ramsey, mother of JonBenet Ramsey. The
author thanks the members of the St. Thomas Law Review for preparing footnote support for this
speech.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id. amend. VI.
3. Id. amend. V.
4. No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995).
5. See Bill Carter. After the Verdicts. Will It Still Sell?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at B 11.
6. No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 286677 (D. Colo. June 2, 1997).
7. No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 785580 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 1997).
8. See David Gergen, A War We've Begun to Win, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16,
1997, at 72, 72; see also NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, April 1, 1997), available
in 1997 WL 5386067.
9. See NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, May 23, 1997), available in 1997
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You may be even more puzzled by the fact that I am talking about the
professional and ethical concerns raised by these performances given the
uneven nature of the recent performances of criminal lawyers in high
profile cases, both prosecutors and defenders. In addition, I am currently
involved in a high profile case in my hometown, so I may be the worst
possible person to speak about these issues.
Obviously, the recent occurrence of many high profile criminal
cases-Simpson, McVeigh, Nichols, and JonBenet Ramsey-is one of the
reasons this topic is important. Yet, it is important to put the problem in
historical perspective in an effort to determine whether things really are
worse than they used to be in the legendary "good old days." Therefore,
this Article will first discuss high profile cases from a historical perspec-
tive. Second, it will place the problem of high profile cases into a proper
social perspective. The Article will discuss similar concerns about public-
ity and the press which exist in other professions and other aspects of life.
With these perspectives as guides, we can endeavor to determine the
severity of the problem. The conclusion of this Article is not startling.
Problems arising from how lawyers and the criminal justice system handle
high profile criminal cases are not on a par with the Middle East crisis or
finding a cure for cancer. However, they are very real problems, which re-
veal tensions, sub rosa, in our democracy, and which must be addressed if
we are to avoid further erosion of public trust in our criminal justice sys-
tem.
Finally, the Article will offer suggestions which, hopefully, can help
alleviate some of the problems. Even though I have devoted most of my
time over the past decade to teaching and not practicing law, I am not
completely lost in the ivory tower. Lawyers can be solvers not just crea-
tors of problems.
Let us begin with a couple of quick "war stories" that illustrate some
of the problems I perceive with media coverage of high profile cases and
some of the sources of my own biases in the matter. When I was a young
attorney many years ago, I was given the following advice by one of the
many mentors I have been fortunate enough to have: You cannot win your
case in the press. This particular mentor handled a number of high public-
ity cases, and he had a pet phrase that he used whenever a reporter asked
him anything about a case. He would say: "I am sure that when all the
facts are known, justice will be done." I watched him say this many times,
WL 5386773; NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, June 2, 1997), available in 1997
WL 11356757.
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and the effect on the reporter was almost always the same. The reporter
would begin to furiously scribble down the quote, sure that he or she had a
news nugget which was headline material. Then the reporter would scrib-
ble a little slower as he or she began to realize that the quote was com-
pletely innocuous and virtually meaningless. Finally, the reporter would
look up with a touch of disdain, only to find that my mentor had fled the
area and that no follow-up questions could be asked.
My own experience with the press bore out the apparent wisdom of
this approach. I was involved with another attorney, whom I shall call
"Bob," in a high profile murder case in a suburb north of Denver. The first
hearing in the case was held in the courtroom in the county jail. The press
was not allowed in this courtroom and was forced to watch the proceedings
on a closed circuit monitor. Apparently, the quality of the picture and the
sound on this monitor was extremely poor because, as we emerged from
the jail, we were besieged by reporters calling out questions.
Neither my co-counsel nor I had any intention of answering questions
from the press, and we headed quickly for Bob's car. All but one reporter
realized that we were not going to help them out and turned back in search
of other prey. One reporter, whom I shall call "Dave," stuck with us and
informed me of the problems with the monitor. About the time we got to
Bob's car, I learned that Dave was not seeking any inside information or
even any quotes for his report. He merely wanted to know what had hap-
pened in court and for when the next court date was scheduled. This
seemed an eminently reasonable request, so I stopped next to the passenger
door to bring Dave up to speed.
Well, the other reporters saw Dave and I talking. Sure that they were
being aced out of a scoop, they came rushing over like a pack of rabid
vultures. The reporters shouting at their cameramen to "Hit the lights,"
"Make sure you get this," and "He's talking, he's talking." Bob got in be-
hind the wheel of the car to escape this mad crowd, but he failed to unlock
the passenger side door. I faced the reporters with my back to the car, one
hand nervously jiggling the door handle in an effort to escape.
The crowd of reporters was throwing questions at me fast and furi-
ous. I was doing my best to maintain my composure in the face of idiotic
questions: "Did he do it?"; "Has he confessed?"; and "Do you think he'll
get the gas chamber?" To each of these inquiries I responded reasonably
and professionally: "I cannot comment." Eventually, however, I lost my
composure. A reporter from a local independent station, who shall remain
nameless because I do not remember his name, shoved his microphone in
my face, gestured for his cameraman to get in close, and asked me the
509
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following: "Can you comment on why you cannot comment?"
The truth is, not only did I lose my composure, I lost my temper. My
response was a loud, semi-profane assault on the intelligence and profes-
sionalism of the reporter accompanied by bulging veins and spittle.
That night on the news, this same reporter was describing the day's
events in that calm and rational Walter Cronkite manner that every televi-
sion news reporter imitates. Without any change of tone, without any de-
scription of the events immediately preceding my outburst, he said: "The
attorney for the accused was contacted for comment following today's
hearing." At which point, my bulging eyes, red face, slobbering spit, and
loud, semi-profane assault on the intelligence and professionalism of the
reporter appeared on the screen.
I exaggerate a touch here, for effect, but not much. The point is this:
The press, or at least this particular member of the press, was not inter-
ested in educating or informing the public. The press was not really all
that interested in the case. The press was interested in a STORY and if the
important facts do not tell a good story, then they will just shuffle the im-
portant facts to the side. To paraphrase Admiral Farragut:'0 Damn the
facts, full story ahead."1 This is not a revelation-the fact that the press
prefers sexy, exciting headlines to the often boring important truth-but
this was my own personal introduction to that well noted fact.
My favorite press response of recent vintage was uttered by a Boul-
der, Colorado prosecutor I know who was asked by a reporter about the
deliberations in the second Oklahoma City bombing case, the Nichols
trial. 2 This particular prosecutor is legendary for remaining unaffected by
the press. No matter how big the case, or how persistent the reporter, he
never says anything. Ignoring this reputation, a reporter for one of the lo-
cal papers called during deliberations to ask for the significance of the fact
that the Nichols jury had been out longer than the McVeigh jury.' 3 My
friend responded as follows:
You know I do not talk to the press. Never have, never will. But on
this one occasion, I will break my cardinal rule and I will respond.
10. Admiral Farragut was a naval officer for the Union during the Civil War, who led the
Union ships into New Orleans opening up the way for the advance of the Union Army. See
BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 120, 138 (Ned Bradford ed., 1956).
11. Farragut's exact words were: "'Damn the torpedoes! Full Speed ahead!'. Id. at 580.
12. United States v. Nichols, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 785580 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 1997).
13. See Jo Thomas, Nichols Guilty, but... ; Conspirator Acquitted of Murder, L.A. DAILY
NEWs, Dec. 24, 1997, at N1, available in 1997 WL 4063146; Kevin Murphy, Bomb Trial Jury
to Resume Deliberations Monday: Judge Declares They Can Serve Without Being Sequestered,
KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 20, 1997, at A6, available in 1997 WL 3034062.
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Furthermore, I will allow you to quote my response and attribute it to
me. You ask me what I glean from the fact that the McVeigh jury is
still out deliberating on the case. Here's what I glean. The jury hasn't
decided yet. Nothing more. Nothing less.
I am completely convinced by my own experiences with the press,
and those lawyers I know, that my mentor was absolutely right when he
told me that I could not win my case in the press and that I should either
come up with an innocuous line like his or just shut up. For the most part,
I just shut up when the press calls. I am pleasant, but I do not say anything
substantial.
However, every now and then a case, or one aspect of a case, puts
this method to the test. Like it or not, there are cases in which the press
involvement has become so intrusive that it does, in fact, affect not just
community sentiment, but the day-to-day workings of the attorneys in-
volved in the case and the very course of the case itself. In these cases, the
image becomes as important as the substance-a bizarre and unsettling
state of affairs to those of us who value reality. It is fine in Hollywood but
not in a real courtroom.
Cases with a profile this high are rare, but these are precisely the
cases on which the public judges us. Unfortunately, these are also pre-
cisely the cases which are most likely to tempt us into behaving out of
character and unprofessionally. I fear that the Simpson case, the Oklahoma
City Bombing cases, and the Ramsey investigation 4 are just such cases.
The tension between the constitutional right to inform the public
about lawsuits 5 and the constitutional right to a fair trial in front of an im-
partial jury6 is far more important than any single case, and the resolution
of this tension has broad implications for our democracy. It is a problem
we must address in order to help stem public dissatisfaction with the
criminal justice system.
I believe that an effective and efficient criminal justice system is
critical to the proper functioning of our democracy. George Washington
said that "the due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good
government,"' 7 and if that pillar crumbles, our democracy is considerably
weakened. Like it or not, fair or unfair, the general public's perception of
our criminal justice system is largely formed on the basis of high profile
14. See Debbie Howlett, Girl's Killing Imbued With Questions, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 1997,
at 3A, available in 1997 WL 6990514.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See id. amend. VI.
17. THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 418 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
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cases.
I also believe that a free and vigorous press is critical to the proper
functioning of our democracy. The current babble of press voices is
clearly far preferable to any sort of government control. The vigor of
those voices, as disturbing and distressing as they may sometimes be, must
be preserved and cherished.
I do not believe the media does a good job covering the criminal jus-
tice system. At best, the media does an adequate job. Considering how
much better, informative, and helpful they could be, and how important the
task is, I think it is fair to say that they do a bad job.
I believe that poor media coverage is contributing to a significant
misunderstanding of the criminal justice system. Minor problems are
blown out of proportion because a celebrity is involved or the case has
caught the public's attention for some other reason. At the same time,
major problems go unnoticed and unreported because they are not easily
reduced to a sound byte for television. Far too frequently, even with the
rise of the lawyer-journalist,' s reports are being made by people who do
not truly understand the topic about which they are reporting. Far too of-
ten, it seems that the focus of the media is on selling more papers, increas-
ing the number of listeners, or attracting the right demographic audience to
appeal to advertisers and not on actually understanding the criminal justice
system and informing and educating the public.
I do not believe the media is entirely to blame for this state of affairs.
Both the general public and lawyers must share the blame. I am not one of
those who says that the public bears sole responsibility because, after all, if
people were not interested in the more salacious side of these stories, the
media would not report the stories that way. However, I do acknowledge
that the public appetite for spectacle does contribute to the way these cases
are covered. I also know that lawyers share some of the blame. Too often,
as individuals involved in high profile cases, we have succumbed to the
lure of the lights and given short shrift to, or completely cast aside, our
professional responsibility. Similarly, as a profession, we have not done
all we should to address the problem.
Finally, while I believe that some of the problem is an inevitable by-
product of the fact that we live in a society which values individual free-
doms and cherishes the freedom of the press as another of its pillars, 9 I
also believe that we, as individuals and as a profession, can significantly
18. See Carter, supra note 5.
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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improve the situation by individual and collective actions. As individual
lawyers and as members of a profession, we must find the best possible
way to balance the rights to free speech and a free press with the right to a
fair trial.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In order to avoid, as best we can, the mistakes of the past, and in or-
der to gain a more complete view of the problem, I believe it is important
to look for a little historical perspective. Problems associated with press
coverage and public comment on high profile criminal cases are not a new
phenomenon.
In 1807, Aaron Burr2" was tried for treason.2' Prior to his trial, the
President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, publicly declared that
the guilt of Burr was "beyond question. 22 The President also declared that
if Chief Justice John Marshall, who was the presiding judge, were to allow
Burr to escape punishment, "Marshall himself should be removed from
office." 23 The Chief Justice declared that "it would be difficult or danger-
ous for a jury to acquit Burr, however innocent they might think him. 2 4
When the President of the United States and the Chief Justice, who also
happened to be the trial judge, made these statements, I suspect it dimin-
ished the level of trust Burr had in the process. I would even bet that he
might have suspected the fix was in. An unbiased observer might easily
conclude that the lawyers said some things they should not have and that
the press exacerbated the problem by reporting the comments. Keep in
mind that this was 191 years ago. Clearly, this is not a new phenomenon.
In the end, however, it came down to the jury and not to the pretrial
statements of the lawyers and observers. The jury returned a verdict as
follows: "We of the jury say that Aaron Burr is not proved to be guilty
under this indictment by any evidence submitted to us. We therefore find
him not guilty."2' It has been suggested that this unusual verdict was based
20. Aaron Burr was commissioned in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War.
After the war, he entered politics and became a candidate for Vice President in the 1800 elec-
tions. Burr's treason charge arose from his duel with Alexander Hamilton which lead to his plan
to lead a revolt with British assistance in the western lands. See GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS 79-
80 (Edward W. Knappman ed., 1994) [hereinafter GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS].
21. This discussion of the Burr trial is largely based on The Trial of Aaron Burr, by J.J.
Coombs. See generally JJ. COOMBS, THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR: FOR HIGH TREASON (1992).
22. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Introduction to J.J. COOMBS, THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR:
FOR HIGH TREASON (1992).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See FRANCiS F. BEIRNE, SHOUT TREASON: THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR 241 (1959).
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on the fact that the jurors knew that certain evidence of a treasonous con-
spiracy had been excluded.2 6 Perhaps the jurors believed Burr was guilty
but were not convinced that the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Sound familiar? Several Simpson jurors made similar
comments after rendering the verdict in that case.27
Another example occurred on October 1, 1910, when the offices of
the Los Angeles Times were bombed, resulting in the death of twenty peo-
ple.2' The bombing was immediately dubbed "the crime of the century" in
press reports from coast to coast.29 The most famous detective in America,
the founder of the Burns Detective Agency,0 was hired to investigate the
crime.3' The investigation was accompanied by enormous national fan-
fare. A suspect was arrested in Indianapolis and put on a train to Los An-
geles without ever being allowed to see an Indiana judge to contest extra-
dition.32 The authorities tried to keep secret the route of his return to Los
Angeles because of fears that supporters of the suspect would try to stop
the train and forcibly remove him from custody.33 His return was front
page news everywhere. 4
His supporters printed up tens of thousands of buttons with his pic-
ture and captions stating that the prosecution was politically motivated. 5
In Los Angeles, 35,000 people marched in a parade supporting his inno-
cence.3 6 Politicians and lawyers met with him in the Los Angeles jail, and
photographs of the men shaking hands appeared in papers throughout the
country. 7 On the morning of October 11, 1911, as the trial began, more
than one thousand people gathered outside of the jail, hoping to catch a
glimpse of the defendant as he headed off for his first day in court.38 Half
of the courtroom was set aside for the press, and press members were al-
26. See id. at 242-44.
27. See ALAN M. DERSHoWrrz, Epilogue to REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON
CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 208 n.* (1996).
28. The discussion of the McNamara case is largely based on GEOFFREY COWAN, THE
PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW: THE BRIBERY TRIAL OF AMERICA'S GREATEST LAWYER
(1993), which is an account of the trial of Mr. Darrow on charges that he bribed a juror on the
McNamara case.
29. See generally id.
30. See id. at 95.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 102-03.
33. See id. at 107.
34. See id. at 109.
35. See id. at 129.
36. See id. at 167-68.
37. See generally id.
38. See id. at 183.
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lowed to set up the tools of their trade, including their communication
equipment, right at their desks in the courtroom. One of the defense law-
yers, Clarence Darrow, was not only issuing press releases and generally
currying favor with the press, he was literally in bed with the press-he
was carrying on an affair with one of the reporters.0
Supporters of the defendant prepared and released a movie' setting
forth his version of the events. National efforts were made to raise money
for the defense.4 - The trial became an important issue in the ongoing
mayor-al campaign in Los Angeles. 43 A nationally known author and re-
porter44 became a confidant of the defense team and actually helped ar-
range negotiations between the prosecution and defense.45
The case I have just been describing is that of the People v. J.J.
McNamara,46 a prominent labor leader whose union was involved in a bit-
ter struggle with the fiercely anti-union owner of the Los Angeles Times.47
The coverage became even more pervasive when, during trial, Darrow
himself was arrested on a charge of attempting to bribe a juror.4' The
McNamara case was settled with a whimper, with McNamara pleading
guilty to reduced charges.49 The public interest quickly moved on to other
things, including the bribery trial of Clarence Darrow, which became the
next "case of the century." 50
The defense strategy in the McNamara case was characterized as a
scheme to sway public support in favor of the defendants, making the state
39. See id.
40. Clarence Darrow was regarded as one of the best attorneys in history. See GREAT
AMERICAN TRIALS, supra note 20, at 308. Darrow represented a wide range of clients from la-
bor leaders to corporate leaders. See GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS, supra note 20, passim. Darrow
was the lead attorney for James and John McNamara. See id. at xix. Darrow was carrying on an
affair with a reporter, Mary Field. See id. at xx.
41. An estimated 50,000 supporters watched the short movie, A Martyr to His Cause, dur-
ing its week long premier run in Cincinnati. See id. at 192.
42. See GREAT AMERICAN TRIALs, supra note 20, at 252.
43. See id.
44. The author's name was Lincoln Steffens. See COWAN, supra note 28, at 209.
45. For a good account of the details of Lincoln Steffen's involvement, see generally id. at
209-34.
46. The McNamara trial started on December 1, 1911, before Judge Walter Bordwell in Los
Angeles, California. See GREAT AMERICAN TRiALs, supra note 20, at 251.
47. J.J. McNamara was the Secretary-Treasurer of the International Association of Bridge
and Structural Workers. See ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN His OWN
WORDS 491 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957). The owner of the Los Angeles Times, Harrison Gray
Otis, used the newspaper as a public platform for his tirades against the unions. See id.
48. See id. at 252.
49. See id.
50. See generally COWAN, supra note 28.
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the villain and a successful prosecution politically and socially unaccept-
able.51 Sound familiar? This description is a pretty fair analysis of the
strategy of the Simpson defense team.52
A description of another trial follows:
Chaos reigned outside the courtroom as the media and public jockeyed
for position. An estimated 20,000 people converged on the small
courthouse; throngs of spectators crammed into hallways and even
broke the glass entrance doors. Inside the courtroom, a maximum of
260 people were allowed to be seated, a restriction that did not deter
some 275 spectators and witnesses; 135 reporters, trial participants,
and court personnel; and for a part of the proceeding, a panel of 150
53prospective jurors, from cramming into the space.
The noise in the courtroom became so great that the judge had diffi-
culty hearing the questions posed by counsel.5" When the guilty verdict
was returned, the court clerk told the judge that he could not poll the jury
because he could not hear them over the din.55 The case was the 1935 trial
of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lind-
bergh's baby.56 It almost makes the Simpson circus seem tame. A month
after the conclusion of the Hauptmann trial, the New Republic concluded
that the trial was one in which "both the defendant and society were found
guilty. The best thing one can say is that it is over. It was a microcosm
showing us many of the faults of our system of justice-and indeed, of our
society as a whole-in one vivid and humiliating example., 57  Mr.
Hauptmann was convicted and Mr. Simpson was acquitted, but this com-
ment from the New Republic applies with equal force.
Some may be thinking that this brief historical review means that
there really is not anything we can do about it-that the problem has al-
ways been and will always be with us. To a certain extent, this is true.
There is no system that is going to completely eliminate the tension be-
tween the need and right to report on matters of public interest and the
need and right to fair trials with impartial jurors. Some may also think that
this historical review demonstrates that little has changed over the last two
hundred years, and since we have survived fine up until now, let us just
51. See id. at 118, 127.
52. For a list of and the biographies of the Simpson defense team, see generally FRANK
SCHMALLEGER, TRIAL OF THE CENTURY: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA VS. ORENTHAL
JAMEs SIMPSON (1996).
53. JIM FISHER, THE LINDBERGH CASE 272 (1987).
54. See id. at 273.
55. See also GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS. supra note 20, at 390.
56. See id. at 386.
57. Both Guilty, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1935, at 82, 82.
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leave it alone. Additionally, there is some truth to this proposition as well.
I do not want to over-dramatize the problem. It is not as pressing as the
problem of what to do about our relations with Iraq.
Yet, as I have already argued, it is an important matter. In addition, I
believe there are some good reasons to believe that the problem is, in fact,
worse than it used to be and that it will continue to get worse. One signifi-
cant reason, which is obvious and well understood, is that the impact of to-
day's media is so much more immediate. A radio or television story can
reach the audience much more quickly than a newspaper or weekly news
magazine. If I do something in court today in a high profile case, it will be
beamed to millions of people before I get home. That sort of immediacy is
more likely to impact my behavior in court than is the possibility that my
performance may be reported in print tomorrow or next week.
An appellate lawyer I know, who was involved in the preparation of
briefs and motions at the trial stage of a very high publicity case, noted
wryly to me that it was hard enough to do his job when he knew that his
briefs would be read by opposing counsel and the trial court. He found it
unnerving and distressing to know that the media scrutiny of the case
would result in the distribution of his briefs on the Internet before he got
home and several talk shows making his arguments the subject of scrutiny
on national television by the time he finished dinner. To the extent that
such scrutiny made him take great care with his briefs, all is well and
good. To the extent that the scrutiny caused him to spend more time on
the matter than was justified by the seriousness of the case itself, it was a
waste of his time. To the extent that the scrutiny caused him to raise issues
that were not legally important, but might be important in the court of
public opinion, it was a waste of his time, the time of opposing counsel,
and the court's time. The effect of the publicity is to lower the profes-
sionalism of the work.
Additionally, speed is not the only important difference between
cameras and printing presses. Many believe that public disaffection for the
war in Vietnam reached critical mass in large part because of the ghastly
images beamed into American homes on the six o'clock news each even-
ing.58 When the war lost the support of Walter Cronkite and the C.B.S.
58. See James P. Terry, Press Access to Combatant Operations in the Post-Peacekeeping
Era, 154 MiL. L. REv. 1, 10 (1997) ("[P]erceived unfair press criticism of the U.S. role [in the
Vietnam conflict] was the most significant factor in the erosion of public support for the war.");
Rana Jazayerli, War and the First Amendment: A Call for Legislation to Protect a Press' Right
of Access to Military Operations, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 137 (1997)




Evening News, this theory holds, middle America followed along.59 It was
not that the Vietnam War was more ghastly than World War I or the Civil
War-in fact, the opposite may well be true 6 -- but neither of those wars
was beamed into our homes. It is not simply that television is more im-
mediate, but it is more persuasive. Television personalities are paid more,
television advertising costs more, and Americans watch more television
precisely because it is such a powerful and persuasive medium.6'
Another important difference is the sheer number of media outlets.
Cable television has dramatically increased the number of channels avail-
able to viewers, and many of these channels cover news and current af-
fairs.62 Information is disseminated over the Internet with extraordinary
and uncontrollable breadth and speed. Specialty magazines now cater to
almost every conceivable lifestyle and interest. One of the consequences
of this increase in the number of outlets is that there has been a massive
increase in the number of pages and the hours of air-time which must be
filled. My cable company provides an entire channel devoted to nothing
but cooking, several channels devoted to nothing but sports, three music
video channels, one of which shows only country music videos, and of
course, Court TV and all of the talk shows that devote a large portion of
their air time to criminal justice matters.
A reporter I know, who has been around the business for a long time,
recently made a persuasive argument to me that these shows are now a
mini-industry. In her view, the mini-industry really began, as an industry,
during the Simpson case.63 Some reporters covered nothing but Simpson. 4
59. See Fred W. Friendly, When War Comes, Whither the First Amendment?, 33 ARIZ. L.
REV. 273, 275-76 (1991).
60. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, 184 (1996) (total casualties in
principal wars of the U. S.: Civil War-646,392; World War 1-320,710; Vietnam War-
211,471).
61. See Karen Martin Campbell, Roll Tape-Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the
Courtroom, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1445, 1445, 1500 nn.17-18 (1996); Anthony D. DellaCroce,
"One Bourbon, One Scotch, One Beer": Each "Spirit" Should Have an Equal, But Limited,
Opportunity to Advertise On Television, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 545, 551 n.29 (1997) (citing Patrick M.
Fahey, Comment, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television Advertisers and Its Effects
on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 648 (1991)); Michael J. Palumbo, Note,
Broadcast Regulation, Has the Marketplace Failed the Children: The Children's Television Act
of 1990, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345, 398-99 (1991).
62. See Jarrod V. Henshaw, Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC: Reconciling Traditional First Amendment Media Jurisprudence With Emerging
Communications Technologies, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1015, 1051 n.58 (1997); Marc Peritz,
Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First Amendment Challenge to Cable Television Must-Carry
Rules, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 715, 764 n.120 (1994).
63. See generally Phil Kloer, Attorneyvision: Lawyers on the Air, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Mar. 22, 1998, at B2.
518 [Vol. 10
1998] PUBLICITY IN HIGH PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
Some shows covered nothing but Simpson.6 1 Cameramen, make-up artists,
and all the support staffs now have a vested interest in the continuation of
the show. If the Simpson show gets canceled when the trial is over, this
mini-industry needs a substitute. In the view of this reporter, one of the
reasons that cases such as the Nanny trial66 or the Ramsey 67 investigation
received so much publicity is that the mini-industry that lives on these
cases promotes a demand for coverage in order to justify its own existence.
As a result, a program will now spend an hour on a topic that previ-
ously would have received only a minute of coverage. Sometimes, of
course, this is very good. There certainly are many important stories that
previously went under-reported. In my view, however, the opposite is far
more frequently true. The expanded coverage is bad because the topic that
is now receiving an hour of coverage really only deserves a minute of
consideration. In an effort to fill the air time, the viewer is often subjected
to: (1) excruciating and unnecessary detail about the event; (2) needless
repetition of the circumstances surrounding the event; (3) inappropriate
(and sometimes wild-eyed) speculation about the meaning of the event; (4)
predictions about the future which really amount to no more than guesses;
and (5) loud displays of disagreement, which often seem staged between
the "expert commentators" which do not advance anyone's understanding
of the event.
This increase in the number of media outlets affects the way in which
the criminal justice system is covered. It is simple economics: More re-
porters chasing the same number of stories alters the price. In this case,
the price is the manner in which stories are investigated and reported.
Both reporting techniques and the sorts of stories deemed worthy of cover-
age that were once confined to the wacky tabloids have become main-
stream.6 ' There used to be a demonstrable and significant difference be-
tween the tabloids and the mainstream media. 9 It is often hard to find the
difference anymore. This blurring of the lines matters because it makes it
that much more difficult to know who you can trust and who you cannot.
64. See generally id.
65. See generally id.
66. Commonwealth v. Voodward, No. CRIM. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Nov. 10, 1997). See also, e.g., Michael Higgins, Law Profs Propose an Ethics Code for Lawyer
Commentators, 84 A.B.A. J. 20 (1998); Terry McCarthy, A Stunning Verdict. A Trial That Riv-
eted Both Britain and America Ends in More Contention, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 67, 67.
67. See Dusty Saunders, Egos Clash During Prime Cable Hour, ROCKY MOUNTAIN. NEWS,
Mar. 5, 1998, at 2D.
68. See Lisa Levitt Ryckman, Newspapers Must Preserve Role as Accurate Records, Hamill
Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 7, 1998, at 5A.
69. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1997).
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When we could clearly distinguish between "serious" journalists and tab-
loid checkbook journalists, we could try to avoid the latter and reduce the
danger that something we said could harm our client or the criminal justice
system. It is not so easy anymore.
The increase in the number of reporters and outlets chasing a story
has another insidious effect. It increases the pressure to be first, to be the
fastest.70 The danger to traditional journalistic standards, like double-
checking facts, is obvious.'
At the same time, control over more and more of our media has
passed into the hands of traditional business people. It has been argued
that the problem with newspapers begins with publishers who are business
people rather than journalists. 72 These owners look too hard at the bottom
line and do not understand, or perhaps do not care about, the place the
media has in society.73
For all of these reasons, therefore, I believe that things are different
and things are changing. The trials of Aaron Burr,74 J.J. McNamara, 75 and
Bruno Hauptmann 76 provide us with very important lessons. However,
those lessons must be tempered with the knowledge that the new and
changing ways in which the media cover the criminal justice system may
demand new and different approaches to solving the problems created by
the coverage.
III. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
We have just examined the problem from the perspective of our pro-
fession over time. As long as we are attempting to put the problem into
perspective, I think it also appropriate to examine whether other profes-
sions in our country suffer similar problems. This will help us determine
whether the problem is confined to the law or is shared by other profes-
sions. My conclusion-that other professions have many of the same
complaints and concerns about media coverage-supports the notion that
lawyers are not solely responsible for the current state of affairs.
70. See, e.g., R.K. Shull, Are Tabloids Any Worse Than TV News and Talk?, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Oct. 16, 1997, at E7. See also David Lightman, A Media Post-Mortem On Clinton Scan-
dal Survey Finds News Coverage Infused with Unnamed Sources, Opinion, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 19, 1998, at A8.
71. See Ryckman, supra note 68. See also Lightman, supra note 70.
72. See Ryckman, supra note 68.
73. See id.
74. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
75. See generally GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS, supra note 20, at 251-54.
76. State v. Hauptman, 115 N.J.L. 412 (1935).
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The oldest profession-by which I mean politics and to which other
commentators apply a different description-complains loudly and regu-
larly about its treatment by the media. Obviously, much of the complain-
ing simply comes from politicians with an agenda. When the press makes
a conservative out to be foolish, the conservative politician complains
about the liberal bias of the media. When the press makes a liberal politi-
cian out to be foolish, the liberal politician talks about the rise of right-
wing radio. Neither politician engages in a great deal of self-criticism.
That said, I think there is a great deal of truth to the notion that the
press does not do a good job covering political affairs. By affairs, I mean
the issues which face our government, not the sexual escapades of the
politicians. The press seems to do a thorough job covering the sexual es-
capades of the politicians, but whether it is a good is far beyond the scope
of this discussion.
The complaints I have about the media's coverage of political affairs
are strikingly similar to the complaints I registered earlier about the me-
dia's coverage of the criminal justice system. I worked in a United States
Senatorial campaign in 1986, and we lost. So take my complaints with a
grain of salt. However, it appears to me that the media is looking for
sound bytes, sexy stories, and headlines. A discussion of the complex
problem of how to ensure the long-term health of our social security sys-
tem is reduced to name calling-the Republicans say the Democrats are
trying to bankrupt us all and the Democrats say the Republicans are trying
to let poor grandma die. Supporters of a woman's right to choose are por-
trayed as killers while opponents are portrayed as self-righteous dema-
gogues who are trying to impose their perverted morality on the rest of us.
The polls I have seen suggest that most Americans are in the middle
on these two issues. That is, most Americans want to preserve Social Se-
curity for those who need it, but they recognize that there are practical
limits on how generous we can be with our retirees. Most Americans be-
lieve a woman has the right to choose but also believe that the right is not
unlimited and that there are competing interests. For the purposes of this
discussion, it does not matter whether you agree with these mainstream
positions. The point is that the press does not really care about these
mainstream positions. The press all but ignores the mainstream because it
is not controversial enough, it is not sexy enough, or it does not create
good sound bytes or banner headlines. The extreme positions, however, fit
the description. So the press reports on the extremists and hopes for prob-
lems. This sort of reporting does a disservice to our political system and
our political discourse.
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I mentioned earlier that lawyers share the blame for the problems in
the coverage of high profile cases. It goes without saying that politicians
share the blame for the problems in the coverage of political affairs. Poli-
ticians are faster than a speeding bullet when it comes to leaping on a
quote of an opponent, taking it out of context, and blowing it up into an
entire campaign platform. It is a sick symbiotic relationship: The politi-
cians need the press in order to get elected, the press needs the politicians
in order to have stories to write about, and both often benefit-despite
whatever noble instincts each may have-from superficial sound byte cov-
erage that does not advance the goal of public understanding but does ad-
vance the goal of getting elected.
The medical profession raises some of the same complaints about the
press. My father worked for a pharmaceutical company for many years
and complained bitterly about press coverage. The creation and testing of
new drugs is a long and difficult process. Some drugs which seemed mi-
raculous when introduced have turned out to have side effects far more se-
rious than their benefits. Rarely were the problems which arose the result
of recklessness-much less intentional misconduct-on the part of the in-
dustry.77 Yet, in my father's view, the media insisted on treating the "big
drug companies" as evil and venal, seeking to bolster their ratings and
profits by using the victims of these mistakes as props in a story.
The name William DeVries may not ring bells in many minds, but
many years ago he and one of his patients were on the front pages of your
local papers on a regular basis. Dr. DeVries was the Utah heart surgeon
who implanted the first artificial heart into a human being. 78 Dr. DeVries
and his patient, Dr. Barney Clark, were engaged in the medical profes-
sion's equivalent of the Simpson trial. The behavior of the press and the
effects of the coverage on the parties involved in the operation show some
striking similarities.
Dr. DeVries described a snowbound group of nearly three hundred
reporters who descended on his Utah hospital to cover the operation and
who overwhelmed the physical plant, disrupted regular routines, accosted
patients who had no connection whatsoever with the surgery, and caused
such problems that the hospital had to station police officers outside the
intensive care unit.79 Was this an important medical and social event? Yes.
77. See generally Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
78. See Jeff McGaw, Candidate for Heart Transplant Dies at 49: Man-Made Unit Kept
Upstate Man Alive, HARRISBURG PATRIOT EVE. NEWS (PA), June 4, 1996, at A]. See also Man
Dies After Artificial Heart is Removed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 1996, at 27A.
79. See William C. DeVries, The Physician, the Media, and the 'Spectacular' Case, 259
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Did it deserve network news and front page coverage? Yes. Did the story
justify disrupting a hospital and endangering patient care? Clearly not.
Even a sports analogy may be appropriate here. I come from the
Denver area, and we love our Broncos. The team is dissected by a huge
corps of reporters from the local newspapers, radio, and television stations.
We have more reporters covering the Broncos than we have covering the
Legislature, Governor, Attorney General, and Supreme Court combined.
We have reporters with vast experience, new reporters, men, women, ex-
football players, and people who never played a single down. We have
call-in shows, out-of-town experts, insta-cams, mini-cams, helmet-cams,
every reportorial device known to humankind, and still the players believe
that the coverage is lousy. In fact, the entire offensive line boycotted the
media, refusing to talk to reporters for the entire season.80 They relented
and spoke with the media during Super Bowl week only when the National
Football League threatened to fine each of them $10,000.1 Coinciden-
tally, the Broncos won that game. 2
The media, to their credit, are not oblivious to the problem.
Newsweek discussed the media coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky story in
an article titled Swept Away by the Swarm.83 The story raises, says
Newsweek, "intriguing questions about the speed, substance and standards
in a competitive environment that makes the world of Woodward and
Bernstein look positively quaint. 814 Many people my age idolized Wood-
ward and Bernstein; I know I did. They were investigative reporters, with
the emphasis on investigation, who refused to accept the government line
and who, through dogged determination and hard work, helped expose a
corrupt President. 5 It seems that today's reporters, with rare exception,
sacrifice this sort of legwork on the altar of speed. If you have to beat the
competition onto the air, you do not have time to double-check your story.
The result is incidents such as the following, described in the same
Newsweek article. The Dallas Morning News reported late one evening
that a secret service agent told one of Keneth Starr's8 6 investigators that he
J.A.M.A. 886, 888 (1988).
80. See Adam Schefter, Broncos Reinforce the Western Front Heavy Security Is the Ticket,
DENy. POST, Jan. 21, 1998, at B9.
81. See id.
82. See Adam Schefter, Superb! Broncos Take the Fifth Behind Elway, Davis, DENVER
POST, Jan. 26, 1998, at AAI.
83. Richard Turner, Swept Away by the Swarm, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48,48-49.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Special Prosecutor to the Clinton Administration. See Scott Harris, Washington-As
Usual, Rep. James E. Rogan Was On the Move, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at B1.
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had actually seen the President and Ms. Lewinsky in a "compromising
situation., 87 The Associated Press distributed the story nationwide, it was
reported in several other newspapers and became the lead story on Night-
line. At midnight, the Dallas Morning News retracted the story.88 Oops,
sorry Mr. President. It is not as if there is not enough dirt to go around in
this story. Examples of this sort from the Simpson case, the Ramsey in-
vestigation, and other high profile criminal cases are virtually endless.
IV. THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
What are we to do? We worry that publicity surrounding high profile
criminal cases is tainting the jury pool which may eventually try the case,89
giving false impressions of the criminal justice system to the general pub-
lic,90 and sometimes impacting the day-to-day work of the attorneys in-
volved in the litigation.9' How can we lower this impact to an acceptable
level consistent with the right and the desirability of a free and vigorous
press?
England and Canada both impose severe restrictions on pretrial press
coverage of cases.92 A couple of years ago, following a series of high
profile kidnappings and murders in Canada involving a couple who kid-
napped and killed young women,93 Newsweek had to alter its Canadian
version so as not to violate Canadian press restrictions. 94 Interested Cana-
dians who lived near the United States were sneaking over the border and
getting their news in this country, 95 so at least some Canadians are as in-
terested in lurid criminal cases as their American counterparts. England
and Canada are generally open, democratic countries, and the restrictions
87. See Turner, supra note 83. See also Carl P. Leubsdorf & David Jackson, Intermediary
Talks with Starr's Staff- Witness or Witnesses Fear Subpoena About Seeing Clinton and Lewin-
sky, Source Says; Ex-Official: News' Story Essentially Correct, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Jan. 28,
1998, at IA.
88. See Leubsdorf& Jackson, supra note 87; see also Turner, supra note 83, at 49.
89. See Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity On Jurors, 78 JUDICATURE 120,
121 (1994).
90. See Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1255-56 (1996).
91. See Kerr, supra note 89, at 121. See also Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials
in the Information Age: The Need for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 100, 101 nn.20, 21 (1995); Roscoe C. Hovard, Jr., The Media, Attorneys, and
Fair Criminal Trials, 4 KAN. J.L. PuB. POL'Y 61, 64-65 (1995).
92. See Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the
Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATuRE 249, 252-53 (1996).
93. See Russell Watson, Sex, Death and Videotape: Multiple Rape and Murder Trial of
Paul Bernardo, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1995, at 53, 53.
94. See Eric B. Easton, Sovereign Indignity? Values, Borders and the Internet: A Case
Study, SEATrLEU. L. REv. 441, 484 (1998).
95. See id. at 444.
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on press coverage do not seem to threaten the general freedom of the citi-
zens. These restrictions clearly serve the fair trial interest but violate fun-
damental American notions about the freedom of the press. In my judg-
ment, Americans would not tolerate them, even if they were constitutional.
A second approach is to try to impose case by case restrictions on the
press. In the 1975 case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,96 the trial
judge, after finding a clear and present danger that pretrial publicity could
impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, entered an order prevent-
ing the press from reporting on five specific topics. 97 The topics included
the defendant's confession and other statements, the identity of the victims
of the alleged sexual assaults, and the contents of a note written by the de-
fendant.98 For a time, the press was barred from even reporting the exis-
tence of the gag order itself.99
All nine Justices on the Supreme Court held the gag order invalid,
although it took them five opinions to do so.' 0 While the Court held that
the trial court was justified in its fear that pretrial publicity could impact
the right to a fair trial,'0 ' the Court also held that the trial court erred in
failing to consider alternatives and went too far in barring the press from
reporting events which occurred in open court.'02 The Court stated that the
trial court simply did not meet "the heavy burden of demonstrating, in ad-
vance of trial, that without prior restraint, a fair trial will be denied."'0 3
This is indeed a heavy burden.
In the Oklahoma City Bombing trials, Federal District Court Judge
Richard Matsch barred cameras from the courtroom and made it crystal
clear to the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, and court personnel that he was in
charge of contact with the media.'" While some lawyers and other par-
ticipants in both trials sometimes appeared in the news, Matsch's rules
about press contact were largely followed, at least once the trial began.'0 5
96. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
97. See id. at 543, 563.
98. See id. at 543.
99. See id. at 567. See also Nebraska ex rel. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 236 N.W.2d
794, 796, 798-99 (Neb. 1975).
100. See Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541, 570-72, 617 (1976).
101. See id. at 562-63.
102. See id. at 563-65.
103. See id. at 569.
104. See United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756, 760-61 (D. Colo. 1996).
105. See generally M. L. Stein, Less of a Circus: Unlike the Chaotic Atmosphere of the O.J.
Trial, Strict Discipline Was Maintained During the Timothy McVeigh Trial, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, June 7, 1997, at 12, 12.
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Matsch ran a tight ship in the courtroom. 106 There are a lot of reasons
why most Americans were satisfied with both the process and the result in
those trials. In my view, one of the most important reasons is that Matsch
kept such tight control over the press and simply refused to let the cover-
age become more important than the event. I believe the Oklahoma City
Bombing trials did a great deal to repair the damage that had been caused
by cases like Simpson and the Menendez brothers.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that a trial judge, while lim-
ited by the free speech considerations discussed in Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation v. Stuart,10 7 still has some power to control the effect of the media
in a particular case. I am not suggesting that trial judges always exercise
this power. In addition, I am not suggesting that it is possible, or even de-
sirable, to drive Court TV out of business. I am suggesting that whenever
a judge believes that ongoing press coverage is going to damage the rights
of a criminal defendant and of the people to a fair trial, that he or she can,
and should, take action to prevent such damage.
I would note that Florida is in the forefront of the use of cameras in
the courtroom.' The Criminal Law Symposium issue of the 1997 St.
Thomas Law Review includes a panel discussion of the effect of cameras in
criminal courtrooms." 9 Rikki Klieman, a Court TV reporter and former
trial lawyer, spoke strongly in favor of cameras in the courtroom, arguing
that they are merely an extension of the general right of public access to
the courtroom."' Trial participants, she argued, quickly become accus-
tomed to the cameras, and there is no perceptible effect on the behavior of
these participants."' She may well be right in the "typical" televised
case-to the extent there is such a thing-but I think she is dead wrong in
the truly high publicity case. It seems clear to me from everything I saw,
read, and heard about the Simpson case that the behavior of lawyers, wit-
nesses, judges, and everyone else involved in the case was significantly,
and for the most part adversely, impacted by the presence of cameras in-
106. See generally id.
107. 427 U.S. 539, 556-62 (1976).
108. See generally Chief Justice Gerald Kogan et al., Television Coverage of State Criminal
Trials, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 505 (1997) (Rikki Klieman and Honorable Stanley Weisberg are
also authors of this article); see also Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in
State Courts: A Historic Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 132, 134 (1994).
109. See Kogan, supra note 108, at 505.
110. Seeid. at505-07,511-13,516.
111. See id. at 505, 507; but see Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-That is the Question, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928, 966 (1996) ("While subjective surveys invariably report that a
majority of those responding indicate that cameras in court had no substantial impact on the
proceedings, real cases prove that cameras do have a substantial impact.").
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side and outside that courtroom.
In other words, it may well be that the only cases in which we really
need to protect the criminal process from the press are those rare cases-
like Simpson, McVeigh, and Ramsey-where the press is not merely pres-
ent but is overwhelming. Again these are precisely the cases in which the
participants are most likely to act unprofessionally because of the press. In
addition, these are the very cases which the public is most likely to use in
judging our criminal justice system. It is a sort of "Catch 22"---we only
want to limit the press in those cases in which they want no limits.
A third approach to dealing with the problem of press coverage of
high profile criminal cases is to try to impose restrictions on the attorneys
themselves."' The most important consideration governing any such at-
tempt is the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada,"3 and the most important effort to comply with that
decision is American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.6.114
Prior to Gentile, most states used some variation of American Bar
Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 to govern publicity in
litigation." 5 That rule attempted to balance free speech rights with fair
trial rights." 6 The basic rule precluded a lawyer from making an extra-
judicial statement which a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-
nated publicly if the lawyer knows, or should know, that the statement "is
likely to create a grave danger of imminent and substantial harm to the
fairness of an adjudicative proceeding."'" 7 The Rule then listed a number
of examples of statements which fit this description, e.g., a personal opin-
ion as to guilt or innocence.' The rule also listed some examples of
statements which normally would not fit this description and which would,
therefore, normally be permissible." 9 For example, a lawyer was normally
allowed to state, without elaboration, the general nature of a claim or de-
112. See generally Gabriel G. Gregg, Comment, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A
Flawed Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1321, 1361 (1996);
Catherine Cupp Theisen, Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of Shoes, 44 U.
KAN. L. REV. 837. 837-38 (1996).
113. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (holding that Nevada Su-
preme Court Rule 177 was void for vagueness as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court).
114. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1997).
115. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068.
116. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 & cmt. (1990).
117. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1978).





The viability of that version of Model Rule 3.6 was severely undercut
by the decision in Gentile.2 ' Dominick Gentile, a Las Vegas lawyer, was
hired to represent a fellow named Grady Sanders in a high publicity case
involving the disappearance of large quantities of cocaine and money from
an undercover police operation. 22 It was Gentile's belief that the prosecu-
tion was politically motivated and that the prosecution was part of an effort
to cover up various misdeeds of prosecutors and law enforcement person-
nel.'2
Contacted by the press outside of the courthouse after his client's ar-
rest, Gentile stated, among other things: "[T]he evidence will prove not
only that Grady Sanders is an innocent person ... but that the person that
was in the most direct position to have stolen the drugs and money... is
Detective Steve Scholl.... I feel that Grady Sander is being used as a
scapegoat."' 24 Gentile went on to detail some of the attacks he planned to
make on prosecution witnesses and on the police investigation.125 Gentile
did, in fact, present this defense at trial. 26 As it turned out, Gentile's the-
ory was correct, or at least it was viable enough to create a reasonable
doubt, because the jury acquitted his client.
27
After the acquittal, the Nevada Bar Association prosecuted Gentile
for violating Nevada's then existing rule relating to pretrial publicity.
28
That rule, Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, was virtually identical to the
American Bar Association Model Rule in effect at the time. 29 The Nevada
disciplinary authority concluded that Gentile had violated the rule, and the
Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed. 30
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the
rule itself did not violate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech but
that Nevada's interpretation of the rule did. 3' The Court viewed Nevada's
120. See id.
121. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048. See also Lynn S. Fulstone, Casenote, Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada: Trial in the "Court of Public Opinion" and Coping with Model Rule 3.6-
Where do We Go from Here?, 37 VILL. L. REv. 619, 631-32 (1992).
122. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1039-42.
123. See id. at 1042-43, 1059.
124. Id. at 1059.
125. See id. at 1063-64. See also Gregg, supra note 112, at 1340.
126. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1047.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1033.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1033-34, 1036-37, 1058.
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interpretation as "a ban on political speech critical of the govemment."'
32
This sort of speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment's protections'
and, since many of the allegations contained in Gentile's press conference
had already been reported in the press and many of the allegations were
proven up at trial, the Court found no substantial likelihood of material
prejudice to the administration ofjustice' 34
The Court made it clear that this sort of speech by an attorney de-
served strong protection and would be analyzed quite differently from the
commercial speech of attorneys seeking clients. 35 In response to the
Gentile decision, the American Bar Association adopted a new Model Rule
3.6, and many jurisdictions followed suit.'36
The new rule changed the pre-existing rule in a number of ways,
132. Id. at 1034.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1039.
135. See id. at 1051-52, 1073-74.
136. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1997). See also Gregg, supra
note 112, at 134546. Rule 3.6 states:
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation
of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(I) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law,
the identity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to
an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (I) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to
aid in the apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and
the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a). a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable
lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue
prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's cli-
ent. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such informa-
tion as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to
paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6.
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some of which are cosmetic, some of which are substantive. 37 The new
rule only applies to lawyers who are "participating... in the investigation
or litigation of a matter."'38 The previous rule had no such limitation and,
at least on its face, applied to all lawyers. 39 Thus, the new rule does not
attempt to regulate the comments or conduct of lawyers who are asked to
comment on cases in which they are not involved. 40 The role of lawyers
who are recruited to be commentators is a topic to which we shall return.
The new rule eliminates the list of presumptively harmful statements
that were contained in the old version.'4 ' The new rule slightly modifies
the list of presumptively permissible statements with the effect of making
that list slightly less specific. 42 These two changes will likely result in
more claims of unethical comments being analyzed on a case-by-case ba-
sis. However, the Comment following the new Rule does list a non-
exclusive set of statements which will ordinarily be harmful, and this list is
virtually identical to the list of presumptively harmful statements in the
existing Rule 3.6.143 A change in the list is that the new Rule includes, as a
presumptively harmful statement, a statement that a criminal defendant has
been charged with a crime, unless that statement also includes a statement
that charges are merely accusations and that the defendant is presumed in-
nocent.'4
The new Rule changes the language describing what sort of speech is
proscribed. The old Rule proscribed speech which was "likely to create a
grave danger of imminent and substantial harm to the fairness of an adju-
dicative proceeding."' 145 The new Rule proscribes speech which "will have
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
ing in the matter."' 46 The difference between the "grave danger" language
of the old Rule and the "substantial likelihood" language of. the new Rule
may prove to be insubstantial. The "substantial likelihood" language was
approved in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 47 but was equated with speech
that "creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm.', 148 The Court it-
137. See Gregg, supra note 112, at 1350-53, 1355-57.
138. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 & cmt.
139. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1990).
140. See Theisen, supra note 112, at 854.
141. See Gregg, supra note 112, at 1354.
142. See id.
143. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 emt. (1997).
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1978).
146. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6.
147. 501 U.S. 1030, 1036-37 (1991).
148. Id. at 1036.
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self noted that the difference may be "mere semantics.
1 49
The new Rule creates a whole new category of protected speech
which could be called the "fair reply." Pursuant to subsection (c), a lawyer
may make a statement which a reasonable lawyer would believe is re-
quired to protect the client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity that was not of the lawyer's or client's doing. 51 In other
words, if the other side (or, apparently, anyone else) tips the publicity
playing field against you unfairly, you are entitled to comment in an effort
to balance the field again. The limitation on the reply is that counsel can-
not say more than is necessary to mitigate the damage.1
5'
This provision may seem eminently sensible as an effort to protect
the right both to a fair trial and to free speech, but I fear that it is fraught
with practical danger. It will be far too easy for one side in a dispute to
claim that "there was some unfair publicity so I had to respond," with the
result that the responses and counter-responses escalate into the sort of all-
out press war that adversely impacts the right to a fair trial, discredits the
system and the profession, and distracts counsel from the real tasks at
hand.
Following the Rule, there is an extensive Comment which begins by
noting the difficulty in striking a balance between the right to a fair trial
and the right to free speech. 52 The Comment frankly recognizes that there
are times when the two interests necessarily collide. 53 The Comment also
points out that criminal trials are likely to be the most press sensitive of all
cases. 154
The bottom line here is that the American Bar Association Model
Rule 3.6 probably goes as far as we can, consistent with Gentile, in limit-
ing pretrial statements by counsel. Lawyers are trained to find ways to
distinguish our particular case from coverage by an adverse rule of law or
decision of the court, trained, if you will, to find loopholes. The truth of
the matter is that a lawyer can make an awful lot of pretrial statements,
while still avoiding a violation of the ethical restrictions.
By way of example, it is likely that under the new rule, a judge is
powerless to stop many of the Simpson type excesses. The Rule proscribes
speech which "will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
149. Id. at 1037.
150. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6.
151. See id.
152. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt..
153. See id.
154. See id. at 71.
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an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."' 55 Once the Simpson jury was
sequestered and theoretically unable to read or hear comments by counsel,
it could be argued that the sorts of statements made by the attorneys in the
Simpson case would not violate the model rule. It is quite clear that what-
ever power might once have existed to control non-participating lawyers is
now gone. There certainly is no way a judge or ethics committee can
sanction a non-participating lawyer for commenting on a case, unless his
or her behavior violates some other rule of professional conduct. 5 6 The
publicity rule makes no effort to regulate the speech of these lawyer-
commentators, nor does the First Amendment allow for such regulation.
157
Finally, the "fair reply" doctrine enshrined in the new rule would have
given every lawyer involved in the Simpson case a safe harbor for almost
everything which was said since the publicity was immediate and perva-
sive.'58
In sum, I see the situation this way: Blanket restrictions on the press
are significantly limited by the First Amendment and the Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart'59 decision. Case by case restrictions on the press
must meet an extremely high burden and are of limited help. Ethical re-
strictions on lawyers must pass First Amendment and Gentile analysis and
are also of limited help.'60 So what are we to do? The following comments
are devoted to some modest suggestions.
V. A FEW MODEST SUGGESTIONS
It does virtually no good to simply whine about these problems. I
have four suggestions, three of which are relatively small procedural sug-
gestions which are not earth shaking but which, if vigorously pursued,
could noticeably improve the status quo. The fourth suggestion-that we
all take more personal responsibility and simply behave more profession-
ally-is more of a sermon than a suggestion. However, it is, in fact, the
only real solution to the problem.
155. Id. at 69.
156. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1303, 1306, 1312-14, 1317 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky, Trial Over, Simpson
Analyst Re-Evaluates Educating the Public is Noble, but How Commentators Do It Needs Scru-
tiny, 81 A.B.A. J. 100, 100 (1995).
157. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1056-57. See also L. Cooper Campbell, Gen-
tile v. State Bar and Model Rule 3.6: Overly Broad Restrictions on Attorney Speech and Pre-
trial Publicity, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 604 (1993); Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note
156, at 1316.
158. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 & cmt.
159. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
160. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1070-72 (1991).
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First, we must, as individual lawyers and as a profession, do a better
job educating those who report on our affairs. Our state bar association
regularly informs local reporters, both print and electronic, that we will
make available qualified and experienced lawyers who can help the report-
ers make sense out of a story and who are available for comment in most
situations. The Colorado District Attorneys Council and the Colorado
Criminal Defense Bar try to make qualified people available as well. Na-
tional organizations-the American Bar Association and the National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers for example-do the same.
The media has made some efforts to make better use of lawyers. At
both the local and national level, it is far more common than it used to be
to see lawyers being used either as full-time reporters covering the justice
system or as commentators covering a particular case.1
61
There is much room for improvement. We should, as a profession,
redouble our efforts to provide the necessary resources to the media so that
the media can report fairly and accurately on legal affairs.
Second, we must, as individual lawyers and as a profession, do a
better job educating those among us who are commenting on cases, either
on a regular or irregular basis. As a profession, we can provide some
training to those of us who are being asked to comment and, as individuals,
we can follow some simple guidelines to ensure that we do a good job.
The Colorado Bar Association regularly sponsors meetings between
members of the press corps and members of the legal profession. The goal
of these meetings is to improve bar-press relations by introducing the me-
dia to the good people who are available and by introducing prospective
commentators to those members of the media who are likely to need their
services. Our bar association also provides some training to lawyers who
are being asked to comment on cases. Pursuit of efforts like these can im-
prove the quality of the commentary and the coverage. We need to im-
prove these efforts.
Third, and closely related to the second suggestion, we should, as a
profession, engage in a dialogue with each other to consider our proper
role when we are asked to comment on a case. Most lawyers who agree to
comment on a case do so with the best of intentions. These lawyers seek
to improve the public understanding of the case or controversy in the pub-
lic eye. While it is flattering to be asked, and it may help business, the real
reason most lawyers go on the air is to help answer genuine questions, ex-
plain the results, and thereby improve public understanding of and trust in
161. See Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 156, at 1311.
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ourjustice system.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has taken the
first steps at trying to create a set of ethical guidelines to assist lawyers
who are asked to provide legal commentary. This initial work is largely
based on two excellent law review articles by Professors Erwin Chemerin-
sky and Laurie Levenson. 62 Even if we are powerless to control what
lawyers say and how they say it, such a dialogue can only help educate us
all and, hopefully, serve to temper some of the more outrageous behavior.
Alas, good intentions are not enough. Even the best-intentioned law-
yer can succumb to stage fright, stage panic, and stage stupidity. Stage
fright occurs when you get nervous upon suddenly realizing that your
comments are going to be memorialized forever and that your law school
professor, your current colleagues, and everyone who knows you, includ-
ing your mom, will have the opportunity to see and hear you and then dis-
sect your every tic, inflection, and word for the rest of your life. Even
those with a great deal of expertise sometimes experience this painful af-
fliction. The affliction manifests itself most commonly by causing in-
credibly stupid words to fly out of your mouth in incomplete sentences that
are only marginally related to the question being asked.
Stage panic is a variation of stage fright that causes the speaker to un-
reasonably-even irrationally-assume that he or she is competent to an-
swer the question posed. Good reporters, like skilled cross-examiners,
know how to make use of silence. A good reporter will ask a question
which falls far outside your area of expertise or which cannot really be
fairly answered given the facts which are presently known. You know that
you should simply say, "I don't know," or, "It's really hard to answer that
at this time." However, when you give that answer, the good reporter just
waits, knowing that lawyers abhor silence the way nature abhors a vacuum
and that we are irresistibly impelled towards filling that silence. Even
media savvy lawyers fall into this trap and say something which, like the
one question too many you ask of a witness, is a mistake the moment it is
uttered-the moment, in short, when it is too late to do anything about it.
Like the one question too many in cross-examination, these words are
now part of the record. You cannot take them back. The more outrageous
your comment and the more you wish you could take it back, the more
likely it is that the comment will appeal to the media and be replayed end-
lessly, over and over. The replays will stop only when somebody else suc-
162. See The Ethics ofBeinga Commentator, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1303 (1996); The Ethics of
Being a Commentator 11, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913 (1997).
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cumbs to stage panic or stage fright and issues an equally inappropriate
statement which pushes your foul-up out of the headlines because it is
newer and the viewing audience wants fresh meat.
Stage stupidity needs little explanation. It is merely our general stu-
pidity expressed in a public forum for all the world to see. We have all
done it. I have already described to you one of my early experiences with
stage stupidity-with the reporters in the parking lot of the jail.
My final suggestion is based on the notion that the only cure for these
afflictions-stage fright, panic, and stupidity-may be to not speak in the
first place. Shutting up should certainly be everyone's "default setting." If
you are not sure whether you should speak, then do not. If you think you
should speak, double check with at least one lawyer friend and one person
with common sense. Your lawyer friend will try to talk you out of going
on the air if for no other reason than simple jealousy. The person with
common sense will try to talk you out of going on the air because, as a
matter of common sense, it is usually a bad idea.
You may also want to check with your mom. My mom, upon view-
ing my first appearance on national television, called and left a message on
my machine as follows: "Pat, you've gained weight, but you looked very
professional. Have you quit smoking? I thought I saw an astray on your
desk. Now what is this case all about?" Moms have a way of putting mat-
ters in perspective like no one else can.
VI. CONCLUSION
We must fight off what I acknowledge is a strong urge to talk with
the press. It is always flattering to be approached by a reporter and to
think that you might see your own name in the local daily or your own
smiling face on the ten o'clock news. A word of warning here: I repre-
sented a young man in a Southern Denver suburb who was accused of two
murders. When a picture of the two of us appeared in the Denver Post, he
was identified as me, and I was identified as he. Needless to say, my par-
ents were amused by the inaccurate caption, particularly since the young
man was accused of killing both his parents.
We must persuade others within hearing of our voice to do the same.
Prosecutors should persuade police officers, judges should persuade court
staffs, defense lawyers should persuade their staffs, and everyone should
persuade witnesses. Do not talk until it is over. This can be very frustrat-
ing for the people who want to get their version out, but we need to make
that effort. We must persuade the press that we are not trying to hide
anything, that we are not giving a scoop to a competitor, that we value a
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free press just as highly as we value a fair trial, and that we are not trying
to muzzle them. We are only trying to ensure that two important constitu-
tional rights are appropriately balanced. We must make every effort to
persuade the public of the importance of a fair trial, even in the face of an
almost overwhelming level of public cynicism about the criminal justice
system.
It is not enough, in my view to shrug off the problem by saying:
"Oh, that was just the Simpson case. That's a one in a million case. Don't
judge the system by that case." It is not enough to say that because, even
if it is true, the fact remains that the public, the press, elected officials, all
of us are, in fact, affected by that trial. Even if we know that the Simpson
trial is not an entirely accurate picture of the justice system, we know that
it is not an entirely inaccurate picture either, and we are all judged by it.
